Uncertain environments are properly described by probability distributions which, as usual, can be collapsed or conditioned into distributions with reduced uncertainty through the processing of environmental information. Organisms which force this collapse gain evolutionary advantage by being able to employ strategies in a known environment rather than in a merely probable one. The accrued benefit gained from processing information can be precisely quantified by comparing benefits returned using distributions prior to, and after collapse, and these often large and immediate benefits can amply justify the evolutionary cost of information processing systems. More importantly, the evolution of information processing systems must necessarily occur in a predictable evolutionary sequence from less complex to more complex. Practical applications include modeling the evolution of sex modeled here as a sequence from asexual reproduction, to single gene exchange, to gene packet exchange, to same species packet exchange, and finally to sexual reproduction, sexual selection, "Red Queen" contests and so on. Modeling this sequence requires extensions to game theory originally designed to model a single game, to allow the simultaneous operation of many games. This extension is called a multigame environment. The dynamical evolution of the development sequence shows punctuated equilibria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Natural, sexual and artificial selection processes partition population fitness distributions into surviving and non-surviving parts to drive evolutionary processes [1, 2] . Then, any other mechanism which is similarly able to partition fitness distributions is also likely to be an important driver of evolutionary dynamics. One such mechanism is the processing of environmental information which necessarily partitions population and fitness distributions. Information processing generating distribution collapse underlies all selection processes and provides a single coherent mathematical framework for treating evolutionary dynamics.
Further, information processing generates real fitness benefits. Organisms occupy uncertain environments which render any benefits to their actions similarly uncertain. The ability to process information decreases environmental uncertainty and increases the ability to select more appropriate actions to necessarily increase probable resulting benefits. Whenever these increased benefits outweigh the cost of information processing, it is possible to predict that this information processing step could evolve. It is to be noted that microscopic mutation events can create information processing mechanisms to cause instantaneous and macroscopically large changes to fitness distributions conferring macroscopic benefits.
The difficulties in predicting a contingent evolutionary sequence are well known [3] , though it is the goal of this paper to demonstrate broadly applicable methods allowing reliable predictions of innovation sequences in arbitrary evolutionary systems. The evolution of sex provides an appropriate test bed for the ability of models to predict plausible evolutionary sequences.
Previous approaches to the evolution of sex include comparisons of asexual versus sexual reproduction to derive the large and immediate benefits needed to offset * Electronic address: m.gagen@imb.uq.edu.au the two-fold cost of sexual reproduction [4, 5] . "Lottery" models posit random gene shuffling which increase variation to improve the chances that offspring will fit a spatially or temporally changing environment [6, 7] . However, observations indicated that sex did not predominate in changing or difficult environments lending credence to "tangled bank" theories which held that it is in uniform environments with intense competition where offspring require the diversification offered by sex [8, 9] . Other approaches include "Müller's Ratchet" wherein asexually reproducing populations accumulate bad mutations over time with sex required to recreate defect free individuals [10] . Contrasting proposals hold that sex tends to concentrate bad mutations into nonviable individuals and so eliminates bad mutations from the population pool [11] . More recently, "Red Queen" models posit that sex provides continual variation over time to prevent parasites from successfully adapting to a population [12] [13] [14] . For recent reviews see [15] [16] [17] . These approaches are unable to correlate reproduction via sex with genome complexity and are thus unable to explain the predominate use of sex by eukaryotes and its relative scarcity in prokaryotes. Additional matters to be explained include sex determination factors where individuals have differing fitness goals [18] , sexual conflict [19, 20] , sexual selection [21] , and segregation distorters and fratricidal genes [22] among others.
To predict plausible evolutionary sequences this paper models an uncertain environment described by multiple, time-dependent resource probability distributions which can be collapsed by environmental information processing. This environment can be modeled using games theory suitably modified to allow multiple games, probable population and resource distributions and feedback mechanisms to create novel resource concentrations to define new payoffs and new games or niches. The creation of new games provides a basic model of evolving and learning systems.
Game theory achieved its modern form in 1944 with the abstract definition of an environment containing only a single game possessing a fixed number of cells, each able to select strategies from an immutable set of possible strategies under the influence of a number of unchanging and known payoff functions [23] . Interesting solutions to various games can be obtained with the assumption of "rationality" determining Nash Equilibria [24] with applications to evolutionary game theory typically seeking to find Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in, for instance, hawk-dove competition games [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Evolutionary sequences are typically verbally discussed using a plausible sequence of individual games showing, for instance, the evolution of "hawk-dove", "hawk-doveretaliator", and "hawk-dove-retaliator-bourgeois" game strategies. (See for example the evolution of cleaning symbiosis in fish [30] .)
The game dynamics generated in this paper is one of long periods of stasis (new games/niches take time to appear) followed by short periods of rapid change (initial entrants to a new game are advantaged by gaining first access to an untouched resource pool and face little competition) generating punctuated equilibria dynamics of stasis and sudden change [31] [32] [33] [34] with applications [35] . Recent experimental tests have shown punctuated change in the size of single celled organisms when subject to directed evolutionary pressures [36] [37] [38] [39] . The approach of this paper contrasts with other methods of generating punctuated equilibria [40, 41] .
Throughout this paper, a crude measure of the benefit and associated costs of an evolutionary step is provided by a single fitness parameter f assigned to organisms which then possess greater fitness in proportion to the magnitude of f . The use of such a simple measure is common in examinations of evolutionary dynamics using simple one dimensional fitness landscapes to examine, for instance, rates of fitness increase (hill-climbing), selforganization and competition [42] [43] [44] . Population genetics models also typically assume additive allele fitness values [45] . This simplistic approach is sufficient to illustrate the underlying evolutionary dynamics.
II. PROBABILITY THEORY IN EVOLUTION
Many unsupported claims have been made that Darwinian evolution is unable to explain the emergence of complexity and of order in the natural world. In contrast to these claims, this paper shows that Darwinian evolutionary processes can be subsumed within a broader information processing mathematical framework. This makes it expected that Darwinian evolution leads to the growth of complex information processing capabilities in suitable supportive environments. This section introduces sufficient probability theory to justify these claims.
Elementary introductions to probability theory use examples such as "select two cards without replacement from a pack", or "select five marbles with replacement from an urn" to introduce selection processes. A selection process conditions an initial probability distribution (every one of 52 cards is equiprobable) to derive a new, selected probability distribution whose reduced width reflects decreased uncertainty. In such elementary probability examples, information is successively applied to manipulate probability distributions to derive desired results. A selection process is equivalent to the processing of information to manipulate probability distributions. Different words are commonly used for these simple mathematical operations including to select, condition, partition or collapse a probability distribution.
The mathematical selection operation can be illustrated using natural, sexual or artificial selection processes which partition a population fitness distribution P (f ) into fitness classes to eliminate the less fit. (Here, the fitness of an organism is crudely denoted by a single parameter f .) This selection process, denoted S s , might act to kill all organisms with fitness less than some value f 0 to generate a new population distribution P s (f ) = S s P (f ) as
where the notations " " and "⊕" mean logical "AND" and "OR" respectively and "|" indicates the conditional "given". In this equation, the normalization factor N = P (f > f 0 ) is the proportion of the surviving population.
(These results apply only if N = 0.) The same operation describes the selection of cards from a pack according to some criteria. The recognition that natural selection processes are subsumed within probability and information theory is of considerable interest as it means that organisms can exploit information processing systems to manipulate population and fitness distributions to their own ends. Organisms have usually been considered as being passive entities on whom selection processes act. However, organisms can exploit information processing mechanisms to manipulate their own and other organism's fitness to become active participants in selection processes. Such manipulations are expected to appear in the evolutionary record whenever derived benefits significantly outweigh information processing costs.
For example, consider a typical predator-prey interaction where predators of some fitness f select their lunch from a herd of prey to obtain a fitness increment ∆f denoting the difference between total derived benefits and total required costs. Final predator fitness is then f = f + ∆f . (This example is equivalent to a child selecting a card from a pack of cards of differing worth to modify the value of their own hand.) From the predator's point of view, the prey herd is described by a probability distribution P (∆f ) giving the probability that any individual prey provides a particular incremental fitness to the predator. Typically, prey herds consist of a fraction η h ≈ 1 which are healthy and hard to catch and which then contribute negative average incremental fitness ∆f h < 0 to decrease predator fitness f < f. (The child selects one of the numerous bad cards to decrease the value of their hand.) Alternatively, a small proportion of the prey η s = 1 − η h ≈ 0 are old or sick and are easy to capture so ∆f s > 0 and the average predator fitness is increased with f > f. (The child selects a rare good card to increase the value of their hand.) The initial prey (card) distribution breaks into a healthy prey (bad card) distribution denoted h, and a sick prey (good card) distribution denoted s, as
with respective means for the healthy and sick distributions of ∆f h < 0 and ∆f s > 0. If the predator does not employ information processing to select a prey to chase, a random selection of prey must be made giving an average expected return r = η h ∆f h + η s ∆f s ≈ ∆f h 0, much less than zero. Conversely, when the predator is able to acquire and successfully process information about a prey's health and can target their hunt to sick individuals, then the probability distribution that guides their hunt collapses to P (∆f ) → P s (∆f ) using the methodology of Eq. (1) with a much improved expected benefit r = ∆f s r ≈ ∆f h . (If the child cheats to gain information to detect desired cards before making a selection, it is easier to select a good card.) Information processing can confer a real benefit on evolving systems and can be expected to be positively selected in evolving systems when benefits outweigh costs.
The evolution of information processing capabilities generally occurs in an ordered temporal sequence from less complex to more complex. Techniques exist for the prediction of such sequences.
Consider the probability of evolution P e of a composite mechanism M = m 1 m 2 consisting of two components m 1 and m 2 via the usual probability decomposition P e (M ) = P e (m 1 )P e (m 2 ). This decomposition allows the trite observation that component mechanisms m i must evolve before the more complex M can operate so that if either of P e (m i ) = 0 then necessarily P e (M ) = 0. Thus, for instance, an eye cannot evolve if light sensitive chemicals are not present in an organism.
Consider next the probable operational success P s of an already evolved composite mechanism M = m 1 m 2 with components m 1 and m 2 . A highly developed mechanism has a high probability of successfully completing its task so P s ≈ 1 while a poorly evolved mechanism has low probability of success giving P s ≈ 0. The decomposition P s (M ) = P s (m 1 )P s (m 2 ) allows predictions of future sequences of evolutionary innovation where there is an imbalance between the probable success of mechanisms m 1 and m 2 . Suppose that mechanism m 1 is poorly optimized while m 2 is highly optimized so
. Then, any increase or decrease in the evolutionary efficiency of mechanism m 2 will not affect the success of the parent mechanism M so that m 2 is neutral to selection pressures. Selection pressures will then act to improve mechanism m 1 while decreasing the success of m 2 until P s (m 2 ) ≈ P s (m 1 ). For example, an organism's internal organs approach senescence at approximately the same time as there is little point in having a heart last longer than the failure point of other internal organs.
III. SIMULATING AN EVOLVING SYSTEM
In this section, a crude simulation shows ordered stages in the evolution of gene exchange processes generating punctuated equilibria.
Consider a simulated environment containing a soup of organisms consisting of a single chromosome which contains exactly 20 genes numbered (g 1 , . . . , g 20 ). There are exactly 100 different types of genes which might populate these chromosomes which are labeled by integers [1, 100] inclusive. At time t = 0, chromosomes are created by random selections from a mutation pool of all 100 possible genes though even numbered genes are 2 −5 = 1/32 times less likely to be selected than odd numbered genes. Otherwise, selection probabilities are uniform.
An arbitrary definition of fitness is imposed on the soup of organisms where the fitness of any organism is defined as 
which has fitness −0.0279. Note the absence of even numbered genes. The evolution of any organism by mutation proceeds over 600 generations where each generation sees the sequential mutation of each and every gene in the chromosome. (This creates a highly accelerated simulation for display purposes.) For each gene in the chromosome, select a potential new gene from the mutation pool, evaluate the fitness of the organism both with and without the mutation, and discard the lower fitness organism.
A neutral mutation mechanism is applied in cases where the mutated and original chromosomes have the same fitness. This can arise when chromosomes have the structure (. . . , x, a, x, . . .) where the total fitness is independent of gene a. (It cancels out of the total fitness expression.) Whenever mutations are entirely neutral, an allowance for neutral drift is made by letting roughly 10% of neutral mutations proceed.
A typical simulation over 600 generations starting from the initial chromosome of Eq. (4) is shown as curve (a) of Fig. 1 . This curve shows an initial rapid increase in fitness as the chromosomes acquire new genes conferring higher fitness. The scarcity of even numbers in the mutation pool means that it is difficult for organisms to mutate to fitness levels higher than +10. Towards the end of the simulation, the numbers of even numbers in the chromosome is slowly increasing allowing some increase in fitness. The probability of any given mutation is constant in time, though the increase in genome order means that the probability of a good mutation decreases in proportion to the increase in chromosome order. This generates long periods of stasis in the simulation at long times. After 600 generations, the chromosome has mutated to (27, 29, 31, 33, 95, 96, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 87, 91, 92, 93, 11, 12, 13, 15 ) (5) with fitness 11.7563. Note that mutations have fixed 5 even numbers into the chromosome. The evolution of fitness of a single typical chromosome subject to (a) random mutation with a scarcity of even numbered genes for generations from 0 -600, (b) gene exchange with other organisms giving access to many even numbered genes from generation 200 -600, and (c) three-gene packet exchange with other organisms from generation 400 -600. The evolution of a single chromosome is followed in each case with new reproduction strategies being introduced at generations 200 and 400 respectively generating punctuated equilibria dynamics of sudden growth in fitness followed by long periods of stasis.
At around generation 200, about one quarter of the chromosomal genes in organisms are even numbered, and this greatly exceeds the number of evens available from the mutation pool (with proportion about 3%). The evolution of organisms creates a new pool of even numbers within the environment with a much better payoff than the mutation pool. If organisms could access the genes of other organisms through ingestion or gene exchange, they could get access to a far higher proportion of even numbered genes than available from the mutation pool. The formal details of this evolutionary step are discussed in subsequent sections. The present simulation merely illustrates the effects of this step.
At generation 200, the initial chromosome of Eq. (4) has evolved to (27, 29, 31, 7, 9, 15, 17, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 23, 25, 91, 93, 11, 12, 13, 15 ) (6) with fitness 9.1101 and containing 3 even numbers. At this stage, the potential benefit from exchanging genes with other organisms to access even numbers creates a bias towards the evolution of single gene exchange mechanisms. (It is a trivial programming task to randomize the time of appearance of this new exchange strategy by making its evolution dependent on growing genome fitness say, though for display purposes this new strategy is introduced at a fixed generation 200.) The effect of single gene exchange between organisms possessing many even numbers is shown in the fitness curve (b) of Fig. 1 . Starting at generation 200, a very steep increase in fitness is manifest as chromosomes become evenly populated by even and odd numbers. The steep growth gradually tails off into a long period of stasis as the chromosome order becomes locked into inefficient arrangements. For instance, by generation 400, the above chromosome evolves to (27, 28, 29, 8, 9, 47, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 92, 93, 11, 12, 13, 15 ) (7) with fitness 12.9535, while by generation 600 it becomes (27, 28, 29, 8, 9, 84, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 92, 93, 11, 12, 13, 14) ( 8) with fitness 13.4535. Here, the fitness combination (. . . , 8, 9, 47, 9, 10, . . .) is locked to change by single gene mutation or exchange as all possible changes are deleterious. Only neutral drift can change this sequence though this has no effect on fitness values. Stasis then exists under single gene mutations and under single gene exchange processes. By generation 400, the above chromosome has evolved to contain large islands of consecutively numbered genes conferring high fitness. This is also true of all other organisms in the environment practicing gene exchange. This novel feature of the environment did not exist before about generation 400 as it was not a feature of the mutation pool and such ordered islands did not exist in the early chromosomes of organisms. As before, the novel appearance of these ordered islands creates a potential benefit to any organism evolving mechanisms to exchange ordered gene packets with other organisms. When the exchange of single genes confers no benefits, the exchange of ordered packets of genes does provide potential fitness benefits.
For display purposes, a new strategy allowing the ordered exchange of packets of three genes between different organisms is enacted after generation 400. The initial chromosome chosen is the generation 400 chromosome of Eq. (7) with fitness evolution shown as curve (c) of Fig.  1 . As usual, the introduction of a new strategy accessing a novel resource leads to a rapid increase in fitness with an eventual tail off into stasis as increasing order makes the exchange of 3-gene packets deleterious. At generation 600, the chromosome becomes (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30) 
with fitness 18.125. Note the persistence of the boundary (. . . , 16, 17, 25, 26, . . .) between consecutive ordered domains. This boundary is relatively impervious to threegene packet exchanges.
The important point about this simulation is that single gene exchanges cannot arise as long as the gene distribution in organisms is identical to the gene distribution in the mutation pool. If these distributions are identical then there is no benefit and many costs involved in creating gene exchange processes, and such processes would not arise. It is only when organism chromosomes evolve to contain a desired resource that is not readily available from mutations, that the benefits of gene exchange processes begin to outweigh their costs. The evolution of chromosomal gene probability distributions governs the benefit payoffs of new strategies and thus governs their evolution. Similarly, gene packet exchange processes cannot evolve until organism chromosomes have evolved islands of genomic order. There are no benefits and many costs associated with the exchange of disordered gene packets. This leads to the firm expectation that packet exchange processes can only arise after the creation of significant genomic order via single gene exchange processes. Thus, packet exchange processes must follow single gene exchange processes which in turn, must follow lengthy periods of random mutations with selection. Evolution must proceed in ordered sequences and evolution models must be able to predict such sequences.
Game theory is ideal for comparing two known strategies to decide which confers higher fitness in a given situation. However, this focus on particular strategies does not allow an examination of the underlying methods by which new strategies evolve. To do this game theory has to be slightly generalized, and this generalization is called multigame theory in this paper.
The required generalizations can be easily done numerically when the programmer predetermines which strategies will appear at some time in a simulation. It is then trivial to roll a dice to determine when new strategies appear. However, it is highly non-trivial to program a computer to recognize the appearance of unforeseen order in a simulation and to evolve a new strategy to take advantage of this newly appeared order. One possible way to do this is to have organisms possess a chromosome specifying their phenotype as well as chromosome extensions specifying their strategy sets. Both of these chromosomes could then be evolved using genetic algorithm programing techniques.
A more powerful approach is to seek to model this analytically. An analytic approach can increase understanding and comprehension in ways that particular and contingent simulations cannot. An analytic treatment of the above crude simulation might be applied to any number of evolving information processing systems including the growth of order in stamp collections or in stock market portfolios [46] . However in the next sections, a heuristic analytic approach to the evolution of sex is presented.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SEX
This section develops an analytic approach to game theory and for convenience begins by grouping together a number of equations, very briefly and almost in table format, which are properly introduced and repetitively used later in this section.
A. Multigame theory
Game theory follows the dynamics of a time dependent environment containing cells able to enact different strategies with varying probabilities. The environment
consists of all cellular records G i for cell i with fitness f together with a resource pool P m (∆f |i) which is conditioned by cell index i and specifies the probability of an incremental change in fitness f (t + 1) = f (t) + ∆f for any cell accessing this resource pool at time t. Each cell's record is
which specifies each cell's necessarily probabilistic fitness distribution P i (f ) (as strategy choice is probabilistic). The use of this distribution avoids the need to track the details of every gene in every cell and makes an analytic evolutionary treatment possible. Cellular records also list available strategy sets S and the probabilities p with which strategies are chosen. Game theory generally considers only a single game so cells must participate with unit probability a = 1 in a single game denoted a, and can participate in all other games j = a with probability j = 0. At time t, cells implement probabilistic strategies
while being subject to some selection operation S s to maximize their fitness probability distributions
Here, k time steps each consist of implementing chosen cellular strategies followed by selection operations. Operations S r and S s do not commute. The above dynamical regime is sufficient to model the dynamics of a single game and is expected to generate changes in the environment due to cellular activities. The dynamical evolution of the environment can generate novel resource pools which can be accessed by novel strategies to define new games in the environment. The evolution of new games is modeled by providing mechanisms to allow cells to access new games with probability j > 0 for some j. At every time step k, the probability that any given cell evolves a new strategy to access a new resource pool is, provided j (t + k) = 0,
where probabilities are determined in terms of functions η 1 (∆F ) and η 0 (∆F ) = 1−η 1 (∆F ). As the probability of evolving a new strategy is low, typically η 1 (∆F ) is close to zero and η 0 (∆F ) is close to one. These probabilities are dependent on parameter ∆F which measures the relative benefits and costs of accessing novel resource pools created in the dynamically evolving environment. Reasonable though heuristic results can be obtained by taking ∆F to be proportional to the benefits to be derived from accessing a new resource pool while the costs of evolving new equipment to access the resource pool are assumed to increase exponentially with benefit, so cost ∝ exp [∆F ] . Setting the evolution probabilities of Eq. (14) to be proportional to the benefit / cost ratio gives
Settingη 1 ≈ 10 −15 say gives the required probabilities with η 0 being close to one and η 1 being close to zero. These probabilities determine the approximate number of time steps required to evolve a new strategy as
Withη 1 ≈ 10 −15 , a large number of steps are required for even highly favoured evolution events to occur. Further, when benefits are zero (∆F = 0) or when costs are high (e −∆F = 0), then the probability of evolving a new strategy 15 in this model. The ability to generate novel strategy sets and new games in response to the environmental dynamics creates a multigame environment. Evolution is then modeled by the appearance and disappearance of novel resources within the environment, which eventually leads to the evolution of new strategy sets and games. This represents speciation events. This model is now repeatedly applied to predict plausible evolutionary sequences in the evolution of sex.
B. Assumptions
The evolution of sex is presumed to occur in a resource rich environment supporting many niches and heavily populated by cells reproducing asexually while subject to frequent mutations due to poor copying efficiencies. Gene exchange mechanisms are presumed not to exist initially as the evolution of such mechanisms is a desired outcome of the model. All cell lines are presumed to have been reproductively isolated for long periods of time ensuring wide genome diversity and an absence of definable species. An intensely competitive environment is assumed implying that mechanisms conferring no immediate benefit are deselected. This ensures that cells lack sibling or species recognition mechanisms, lack the mitotic spindles required for sex, lack cytoplasmic transport mechanisms for foreign genetic material, lack mechanisms preventing the immediate copying of separated DNA strands, and so on. In this environment of widely divergent genomes any attempt to reproduce sexually is immediately lethal.
C. Asexual reproduction with mutation
Consider an environment E(t) containing cells i each with fitness denoted f reproducing asexually (strategy S I with probability p I determined by copying and checking efficiencies) while being subject to occasional random mutations (strategy S m with probability p m determined by background radiation levels and copying efficiencies). The absence of other strategies implies p I + p m = 1. Asexual reproduction is presumed to create daughter cells of identical fitness to parent cells while mutations can increment or decrement daughter fitness by an amount ∆f with probability P m (∆f |i) conditioned on cellular index i. As usual, this distribution is heavily weighted to deleterious values with mean ∆f m 0 as the vast majority of mutations decrement fitness while only a few mutations offer good or positive returns.
Mutation benefits must be conditioned on cellular index i as a good mutation for one cell is a bad mutation for another cell. Further, as cellular fitness levels increase and genomes become more highly organized, beneficial mutations become more and more rare. This was observed in the previous simulation of Fig. 1 . Thus, this paper assumes that as the average cellular fitness level of cell if
rises, the distribution P m (∆f |i) migrates to the left
for example so that the probability of beneficial mutations decreases
This models the inability of resource pools to provide ever increasingly beneficial mutations so that cells relying on these pools eventually cease to increase fitness. This mechanism generates stasis. (See Fig. 2 while a simple analytic example of these strategies appears in Appendix A.) For simplicity, the mutation distribution is considered to be time independent and not conditioned by either gene location or degree of genome complexity. In addition, conditioning events which can create macroscopic changes in the mutation incremental fitness distribution P m are ignored. For example, a lethal mutation at one site instantly makes almost any other mutation at that site highly beneficial. Describing this conditioned distribution could be done using a new distribution P m (∆f |m 1 , s 1 ) where m 1 is a prior mutation at site s 1 .
At time t = 0, cell i possesses a probable fitness distribution P i (f, 0) of low fitness as genomes are initially constructed from a number of non-selected mutations. (See Fig. 2 .) Fitness is improved by judicious reproductive strategy selection S r = a (p I S I + p m S m ) to maximally increase fitness in a selective environment. Natural selection S s operates on all cells simultaneously to partition the entire population into high and low fitness classes with elimination of the low fitness class. A typical selection operation might be modeled as
i ∈ low fitness class,
(See Appendix A for further examples.) Maximization of fitness growth rates for each cell is then performed using Eq. (13) . Repeated cycles of reproduction with variation and selection will enact a Darwinian selection process in which the cellular population eventually develops highly fit, though widely divergent genomes over time as the occasional good mutation is incorporated into cell lines. This process will tend to increase fitness returns, initially quite rapidly and then more slowly as more and more high fitness mutations are incorporated into cellular genomes. The rate of fitness increase is expected to asymptote to some maximum as it takes longer and longer to randomly pick better mutations as modeled by Eq. (19) . The generated dynamics is expected to be similar to be that shown in the simulation of Fig. 1 . The need to maximize fitness growth rates in a competitive environment allows predictions about strategy selection probabilities. Successful cells initially optimize their rates of fitness growth by setting p m ≈ 1 as initial fitness levels are very low, asexual reproduction offers only continued low fitness and mutations are relatively beneficial. As fitness increases mutations become increasingly deleterious and cells are expected to minimize mutations p m ≈ 0 by investing in increased genome copying efficiencies to preserve hard won gains. A novel feature of this approach is that the optimum strategy mix changes over time as population fitness levels change.
D. The evolution of gene exchange
The evolving environment E(t) now surrounds any individual cell with many other cells offering concentrated sources of food and energy leading to evolution of cellular ingestion and digestion mechanisms. Similarly, neighbouring cells are effectively pre-packaged sources of novel, high fitness genetic material leading to the evolution of gene acquisition and exchange mechanisms. The equivalent point in the previous simulation occurs when evolution by random mutation populates cellular genomes with the even numbers which are scarce in the mutation pool creating rewards for the evolution of gene exchange mechanisms.
If a cell obtained genetic material through ingestion or by exchange from its neighbouring cells, it would access genetic material which had been subject to many generations of selection and which carries high fitness. Denote the probable incremental fitness returns to cell i when genetic material is exchanged with cell j as P e (i, j, ∆f |i) which, as usual, is conditioned on cell index i. Then, increasing fitness of cell i decreases the probability of a beneficial exchange taking place. (See Fig. 3 .) This distribution offers high average fitness returns with mean ∆f e much greater than those available from the mutation pool, ∆f m 0. With the appearance of this new genetic resource pool, the environment evolves to be
This evolved environment offers two different reproduction games for cells even though no cells have yet evolved novel gene exchanging strategies. This expanded array of reproduction strategies is explicitly recognized using expanded cellular genomes
recognizing that cells can enact two reproduction strategies accessing strategy mix {p I , p m , S I , S m } with probability a = 1 (certainty), and an as-yet-unevolved strategy {p e , S e } accessed with probability e = 0 (not evolved yet). No other games exist at the moment so the probability of implementing any other strategies is zero j = 0, ∀j = a, e. Of course, some of these presently inactive games might evolve subsequently when potential benefits ∆F become positive as discussed in later sections. Each cell's reproduction strategy is then
where a + e = 1, p I + p m = 1 and p e = 1. Natural selection continues to operate as in Eq. (20) making cell line survival contingent on continually improving fitness.
Cells accessing only the mutation pool derive an average fitness increase of p m ∆f m ≈ ∆f m 0 when p m ≈ 1. In contrast, any cell able to access genetic material from other cells by evolving a new strategy S e can obtain an average benefit ∆f e 0. This creates a potential return difference ∆F = ∆f e − ∆f m 0, and while not yet realized, this potential difference tilts selection processes acting on random variation to preferentially select mechanisms realizing and exploiting this potential return difference. The probability that strategies evolve to access benefits ∆F from the novel resource is given by Eq. (14) .
Prior to the evolution of high fitness cell lines in the environment, the benefit derived from gene exchange is ∆F = 0 ensuring that gene exchange processes can not evolve. However, after the appearance of high fitness cell lines in the environment the potential benefit becomes ∆F > 0 so every cell throws a dice at each time step to determine if it has evolved a novel mechanism giving access to the genes of other cells. As shown in Eq. (16), the number of steps is large and of order 10 15 steps after the appearance of high fitness cellular genomes . The generated dynamics is one of long periods of stasis punctuated by moments of evolution. It is to be noted that strategies to provide single gene exchange might evolve as they confer greater benefits than random mutations. However, packet exchange mechanisms cannot yet evolve as genomes lack sufficient order to make this worthwhile and ∆F = 0 for packet exchange. Further, the specific mechanisms implementing the strategy are not specified in this approach.
Once the evolution of new strategies has occurred, gene exchanging cells re-apportion their participation between all existing reproduction games. For a given cell, if proportion a is devoted to asexual reproduction and mutation, and proportion e is spent on exchange processes, then the expected average incremental return is approximately m ∆f m + e ∆f e when p m = 1 and p e = 1. As this average return is maximized by setting e ≈ 1 there will be strong selection pressures for cells to minimize asexual reproduction and random mutations and obtain new genetic material only from the pre-selected genes of proven high fitness in other cells.
The population then rapidly bifurcates into a class of cells described by ( a , e ) ≈ (0, 1) with high fitness obtained by gene exchange mechanisms obtained by setting p I ≈ p m ≈ 0 and p e ≈ 1, and a class of non-exchanging cells with low fitness described by ( a , e ) ≈ (1, 0) and with p I + p m = 1 and p e = 0.
If the component populations occupy the same niche the less-fit, non-exchanging population will be rapidly replaced. However, it is likely that the large and immediate benefits acquired from exchange processes will ease existing evolutionary constraints as increased efficiencies in one area offset losses in other areas. On the evolutionary fitness landscape, what had previously been insurmountable barriers become passable with the newly acquired benefit leading to a spreading of the population over the fitness landscape. This increased spread samples many more local fitness maxima leading to a radiation of the species into novel niches. In this radiative case, both component populations may survive in differing niches.
E. Gene packet exchange
The evolution of single gene exchange processes leads to an initial rapid growth in cellular fitness levels which decreases the conditioned incremental benefit derived from single gene exchange processes leading to a long period of stasis. It is expected that the exchange of single genes eventually become deleterious as consistently high fitness genomes are highly ordered. Then, the exchange of randomly selected single genes even from high fitness cells will eventually destroy sufficient genome order to negate the benefits of new gene acquisition. At this stage, cellular fitness levels stagnate and stasis is approached. If the exchange of single genes becomes deleterious because of ordered interconnections between the genes, then the exchange of ordered packets of interconnected genes becomes beneficial. The equivalent point in the simulation of Fig. 1 occurs when single gene exchange leads to cellular genomes populated by islands of order but trapped against further fitness increases. The growth of the islands of order potentiates the exchange of ordered gene packets. This cannot occur until single gene exchange processes have created such ordered islands.
Potential benefits then exist for any cell evolving a strategy S p allowing the exchange of ordered gene packets which tilts selection pressures towards the evolution of this strategy. The methodology straightforwardly follows that above. On the appearance of such strategies, the population bifurcates into a class ( a , e , p ) ≈ (1, 0, 0) relying on no exchange processes, a class relying on single gene exchanges ( a , e , p ) ≈ (0, 1, 0) and a new class relying on ordered gene packet exchange ( a , e , p ) ≈ (0, 0, 1).
Repeatedly applying the above approach, the exchange of packets of genes within the same species eventually becomes deleterious as genomes become so highly structured that only the duplication of an entire genome can maintain the required degree of order. This will potentiate the exchange of entire genomes. This methodology then correlates species specific and sexual reproduction with increasing genomic order. At some stage in this increase in genome order, speciation events must occur. These are considered in the next subsection.
F. Speciation
As seen in the simulation of Fig. 1 , the exchange of gene packets allows a rapid increase in fitness based on increasingly ordered genomes. However, a simulated genome exploiting genes in the range {10 -30} derives little benefit from exchanges with genomes exploiting genes in the range {70 -90}. Exchanges between such cells are deleterious and become increasingly deleterious over time as genome order increases. This suggests that there are benefits to evolving mechanisms to distinguish genome classes so cells can optimize their packet exchange processes.
While poorly understood, it is well accepted that genomes are highly ordered both temporally and spatially, and over both short and long ranges. Shuffling genes via exchange will by chance create some well ordered genomes with high fitness which survive to populate the environment. With increasingly ordered genomes, the random insertion of gene packets destroys more order and fitness than are contributed by new gene packets. At this stage gene packet exchange mechanisms with randomly selected cells becomes increasingly deleterious. Conversely, packet exchanges with cells which possess a similarly ordered genome become relatively advantages.
Genomes can probably achieve high fitness through ordering in an infinite number of ways. However, when the rate of chance discovery of novel ordering schemes is significantly less than the rate of spread of an existing scheme through the population, it is expected that a limited number of randomly selected ordering schemes come to dominate the population. The population of undifferentiated cells is expected to naturally undergo a sort of crystallizing phase change into classes where cells in each class possess similar ordering schemes. Subsequently, each of these different ordering schemes is expected to become increasingly incompatible with each other.
At this stage, cells can be naturally partitioned into classes where gene exchange within a class is beneficial, while the gene exchange outside a class is deleterious. The incremental exchange benefit probability distribution is then conditioned by cell index and class membership P e (i, j, ∆f, n, m) describing exchanges between cell i ∈ n th class and cell j ∈ m th class. (Conditioning is ignored here.) When n = m, exchange benefits are high with P e (i, j, ∆f, n, n) = P e,nn (∆f ) having mean ∆f nn 0. Conversely, if cells occupy different classes so n = m then exchange benefits are low with P e (i, j, ∆f, n, m) = P e,nm (∆f ) having mean ∆f nm 0. At this stage, the environment evolves to
where I(i) denotes a possible information distribution within the environment carrying cellular class marker information. Markers might be external membrane marker molecules or behaviour patterns. For environments where the information distribution does not exist to be exploited, necessarily the benefits of information processing are identically zero, ∆F = 0, so the evolution of information processing mechanisms has zero probability. Each gene exchanging cell's record becomes
where c = 0 defines a new potential game where cells target only their own genome class using strategy S c to access the information distribution I(i) with probability p c . All exchange processes are subsumed within game ( e , p e , S e ) here. For clarity, we do not show the many other potential games for which current potential benefits ∆F = 0 effectively preventing game evolution at this stage. The evolution of these potential games might occur at some stage in the future. Provided the information exists within the environment, cells acquiring and processing information about class membership can realize substantial benefits. Following the approach of Eq. (2), for cell i ∈ n th class the potential exchange population can be partitioned into low and high return classes P e (i, j, ∆f, n, m) = η nn P e,nn (∆f ) + η nm P e,nm (∆f ) (26) where η nn and η nm are the population proportions of high and low fitness classes respectively. It is usually the case that η nm ≈ 1 and η nn = 1 − η nm ≈ 0 giving an average incremental benefit obtained from exchanging with a randomly selected cell of ∆f r ≈ ∆f nm 0. Conversely, any cell exploiting environmental information to target exchanges to their own class forces a collapse P e (i, j, ∆f, n, m) → P e,nn (∆f ) using the methodology of Eq. (1). This collapse provides an average incremental benefit of ∆f nn much greater than that obtained from random selections ∆f nm .
As previously discussed, a potential incremental fitness difference ∆F = ∆f nn − ∆f nm 0 exists which creates selection pressures for the evolution of mechanisms S c able to recognize and exploit only high fitness classes. The low probability of strategy evolution ensures that about 10 15 or more steps are required after the appearance of classes in the environment to evolve suitable novel strategies S c . Once such mechanisms appear, it is expected that cells maximize their rate of fitness increase by setting c ≈ 1 leading to the expected population bifurcation. One portion of this bifurcated population will be non-speciated and able to exchange genes with any other organisms ( a , e , c ) ≈ (0, 1, 0). Another portion of the population will exhibit more highly ordered genomes, will be speciated and will be able to exchange genes only within their own species ( a , e , c ) ≈ (0, 0, 1).
G. Sexual selection and information processing
The above methodology can be repeatedly applied with the stasis of one period conditioning the next period of evolution. As an illustration, consider a model of sexual selection generalizing the previous model of predatorprey interactions [Eq. (2)]. The methodology of the previous subsection is repeated.
Total genome exchange eventually becomes deleterious when conducted with a randomly selected (same species) organism as these organisms themselves have widely divergent fitness levels. The probabilities of a high or a low fitness gene exchange is then described by a probability distribution dividing the population into high and low fitness classes. Any organism able to process environmental information collapsing this probability distribution derives a substantial benefit. These potential benefits tilt selection towards the evolution of mechanisms allowing the targeting of only that small subclass of high fitness organisms.
These selection processes explain selection effects on trait markers like the "The peacock's tail" for instance. Here, class distinguishing information I(i) is carried by some trait. The existence of the distribution I(i) within the environment makes it beneficial to evolve strategies to directly manipulate this distribution to increase organism fitness.
In the case of the peacock's tail, if large tails are considered a marker for high fitness, then the most direct strategy to manipulate I(i) to ensure inclusion in the high fitness class is to evolve large tails. An alterna-tive formulation applies to cases where organism fitness is undetectable but correlated to some handicap. Then, the larger the handicap an organism can demonstrate, the greater its underlying fitness. This information-based correlation drives a competitive increase in handicap size as organisms strive to obtain the benefits of membership in the high fitness class.
More generally, in environments where an information distribution I(i) exists, it is possible for organisms to gain benefit by directly manipulating that information distribution to maximize their fitness. Any strategy which manipulates information to merely create the appearance of an increase in an organism's fitness, or which merely creates the appearance of a decrease in another organism's fitness will carry potential benefits. This then predicts the evolution of threat displays and bluffs, camouflage, parental training to find food or for cooperation, bluff detection, counter aggression, lures, baits, traps and congames, and so on.
H. Symbiotic and Red Queen feedback races
The above approaches can be readily generalized to multiple interacting populations.
Consider two different populations A and B obtaining benefit from each other and where, at any time, each population can be partitioned into distinct classes. Write the population fitness distribution for organism i of population A currently occupying the n th class and organism j of population B currently occupying the m th class as
Suppose the population interaction is such that the fitness of individuals in each population depends on the current population classes such that (27) In the case where n = m, δ nm = 1 and populations A and B have fitness distributionsÃ i1 (f ) andB j1 (f ) respectively, while if n = m, δ nm = 0 giving these populations fitness distributionsÃ i2 (f ) andB j2 (f ) respectively. These fitness distributions have been written to explicitly show the partitioning effect of class information.
A cooperative symbiosis between the two populations can be modeled by ensuring that populations occupying complementary classes n = m have high average fitness soÃ i1 (f ) andB j1 (f ) are heavily weighted to positive fitness values. Conversely, populations having different class n = m suffer low fitness implyingÃ i2 (f ) andB j2 (f ) are weighted to negative fitness values.
Competitive Red Queen type arms races between the populations are modeled by simply adjusting the constituent probability distributions. If A population members (predators or parasites) occupy the same class as population B members (prey or hosts) then population A cells have high fitness and population B cells have low fitness. Thus, when n = m,Ã i1 (f ) is weighted to positive fitness levels whileB j1 (f ) is weighted to negative fitness levels. When the cells occupy different classes n = m predators have low fitness withÃ i2 (f ) being weighted to negative fitness levels while prey have high fitness levels withB j2 (f ) being weighted to positive fitness levels.
Given these class differentiated fitness distributions, there exists potential benefits for any organisms with low fitness to evolve new strategies to effect a class change to realize potential benefits and to maximize fitness. As usual, the existence of potential macroscopic benefits tilts selection pressures towards the evolution of class targeting or class changing strategies.
For symbiosis, strong selection pressures ensure that both populations occupy the same class, and the evolution of either population into a new class creates strong potential benefits for further evolution of either population to make the classes congruent. For Red Queen arms races, strong potential fitness benefits drive population B to evolve into any new class away from population A and for population A to track population B into this new class. This section assumes that class changing mutations occur one at a time, though ideally, population B would evolve a single mechanism to continually change its class every generation to prevent population A from ever catching up. In turn, this will pressure population A to develop its own mechanisms to speed up exploration of new classes. This argument reproduces the original Red Queen models positing sex as a class scrambling mechanism allowing prey (hosts) to stay ahead of predators (parasites). In turn, predators (parasites) must either exploit sex themselves or exploit short lifecycles, many offspring and high mutation rates to sample many genome classes in their pursuit of prey (hosts).
The above formalism linking fitness benefits across multiple populations can be readily extended. For instance, a model of chromosome imprinting might treat each contributed chromosome as a separate population characterized by its own genome order and competing with its partner chromosome for gene expression. Similarly, "selfish gene" models would model two populations consisting of genes and of phenotypes where a gene's fitness is determined by the fitness of all the phenotypes in which it exists. All previously discussed mechanisms can be routinely applied to this dual population model.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper generalizes game theory to develop a multigame environment featuring uncertainty which is described by probability distributions. The presence of these distributions makes it beneficial for participants to acquire and process environmental information to collapse distributions to garner benefits. In this perspective, natural, sexual and artificial selection processes which similarly collapse population distributions are subsumed within a wider information processing mathematical framework. Further, the dynamics of the environmental distributions governs the evolution of new games and game strategies using probabilistic algorithms. This extension to game theory is called multigame theory and allows the natural modeling of evolution processes and the prediction of plausible evolutionary sequences. An application was made to the evolution of sex with predicted sequence from asexual reproduction, to single gene exchange, to gene packet exchange, to speciated packet exchange and then to full sexual reproduction featuring sexual selection, "Red Queen" contests and so on. These predictions were made on the basis of analytic work. A simple simulation was presented showing the expected punctuated equilibria dynamics.
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APPENDIX A: DARWINIAN EVOLUTION OF FITNESS PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
This section considers a simple model of changing fitness distributions using Darwinian evolution processes including only reproduction with variable fitness and selection for high fitness. Previously, this paper only considered individual fitness probability distributions P i (f, t). This section considers total population fitness distributions
where n is the number of organisms in the population. Considering a total population fitness distribution removes the need to consider many individuals and simplifies the analysis and demonstration of evolutionary dynamics. Suppose the population reproduces via a random mutation strategy S m with probability p m and an identity operation S I with probability p I followed by a selection strategy S s . Over k times steps, the generated probability distribution is
The dynamics expected over many iterations is one where the fitness of the population slowly increases as mutations broaden the population distribution while selection eliminates poor performers. This illustrates Darwinian evolution theory. Consider first the effects of mutation. Set p I = 0 and consider reproduction via mutation conferring an average incremental fitness benefit ∆f described by distribution P m (∆f |f ) conditioned on average population fitness level (previously cell index i) so that the probability of beneficial mutations decreases as average fitness levelsf rise. As a total population is being considered, the decrease in beneficial mutations can be modeled via
where thef -factors are scale parameters introduced to shrink the magnitude of possible variations while maintaining the area. This creates an asymptotic ceiling for maximum population fitness asf → ∞ forces fP m (f ∆f ) → δ(∆f ), a delta function forcing mutational benefit ∆f → 0 with certainty. The reproduced distribution is P r = S m P (f, t) where where ∆f = f − f . This equation shows that a parent population with initial proportion P (f , t) having fitness f then suffers a fitness variation ∆f = f − f to end with fitness f with probabilityfP m (f ∆f ). Finally, an integration over all the paths gives the final fitness probability P r (f, t). (This derivation ignores the increased fecundity of higher-fitness organisms and subsumes this weighting towards higher fitness values within the selection procedure described next.) The operation of the selection strategy S s is illustrated using a selection process with effectiveness s with s = 0 giving no selection and s = 1 giving strong selection. This operation chooses an organism of fitness f with population proportion P r (f ) and allows it to survive without selection with probability (1 − s) and kills it with probability proportional to both s and the number of other of organisms with lower fitness. This gives P s (f, t + 1)(f ) = S s P r (f, t) equal to
where the normalization factor N is required as members of the population are being discarded or killed off and is chosen to ensure that P s integrates to unit area. Other selection operations might have been chosen. For concreteness, consider an analytically tractable example of this cycle in operation. Consider the fitness probability distributions shown in Fig. 4 which shows a variation mechanism providing a uniform incremental fitness change P m (∆f ) = 1/(a + b) distributed between −a ≤ f ≤ b with a, b > 0. The present population fitness distribution is taken to be uniformly distributed about the origin P (f, t) = 1/2c between −c ≤ f ≤ c for c > 0. Here, take the genome size scale factor to bef = 5.
Consider first the simple case where c → 0 so that P (f ) → δ(f ), a delta function. This immediately forces the reproduced population to be P r (f ) =fP m (ff) while setting zero selection s = 0 gives P s = P r (f ). Alternatively,when selection operates with s = 1 we have 
with N chosen for normalization. This curve shows a distinct shift towards higher fitness values. (See Fig. 4.) 
